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Abstract Considers that in ecosystem, landscape and global ecology, an energetics reading of 
ecological systems is an expression of a cybernetic, systemic and holistic approach. In ecosystem 
ecology, the Odumian paradigm emphasizes the concept of emergence, but it has not been 
accompanied by the creation of a method that fully respects the complexity of the objects studied. In 
landscape ecology, although the emergentist, multi-level, triadic methodology of J.K. Feibleman and 
D.T. Campbell has gained acceptance, the importance of emergent properties is still undervalued. In 
global ecology, the Gaia hypothesis is an expression of an organicist metaphor, while the emergentist 
terminology used is incongruent with the underlying physicalist cybernetics. More generally, an 
analytico-additional methodology and the reduction of the properties of ecosystems to the laws of 
physical chemistry render purely formal any assertion about the emergentist and holistic nature of the 
ecological systems studied. 
 
. . . to divide each of the difficulties under examination into as many parts as possible, and as 
might be necessary for its adequate solution (Descartes, 1637). 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The aim of Descartes was to develop a logical method that could serve as a guide to 
reasoning, so as to arrive at « clear » and « distinct » ideas. That said, in the scientific 
paradigm dominant amongst the various scientific communities today, from physicians to 
sociologists, biologists and psychologists, this methodological maxim has gone well beyond 
the initial function of « enlightening » the mind. It became the clear basis of the epistemic 
approach which takes the reductionist credo of the extreme decomposability of the entities 
studied as its crowning height. When such an approach, however legitimate, becomes « the 
universal method », it nevertheless risks turning into a « metaphysical system », the success 
of which is due to the elimination of any phenomena that might undermine its value 
(Feyerabend, 1965, I chap.). 
The variables considered in the scientific models are necessarily limited, because with 
respect to biological and psycho-sociological phenomena, unlike man-made machines, the 
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totality of components and their relationships can never be fully known. The search to be 
exhaustive is an unattainable ideal. 
The reductionist paradigm holds that the organization levels of reality are characterized by 
different degrees of semantic value: the laws and theories of levels said to be « fundamental » 
(e.g. physics, chemistry, genetics) should make it possible to explain and predict the 
characteristics of other levels (e.g. ecology, biology, psychology). From this point of view, 
the latter are entirely epiphenomenological. This directly raises a classic topic in the 
philosophy of science, which is whether « emergent properties » are a phenomenological 
reality? This epistemological problem concerns all scientific disciplines. It has, of course, 
played a particularly important role in the cybernetics and systems models, a role that in all 
likelihood is destined to become even more significant. Paradoxically, the term ‘emergence’ 
and the conception itself were entirely alien to cybernetics at its origins (Wiener, 1948, 1950). 
For a sense of how much this has changed today, it is interesting to see just how much space 
on Principia Cybernetica Web, for example, is devoted to the analysis of the multiple facets 
and implications of the concept of emergence in cybernetics and systems theory. At the 
moment, by way of a conventional introduction, we can say simply that the « emergent 
properties » of a given integration level cannot be explained, predicted or deduced by the 
study of its components. 
Among cyberneticists, Ross Ashby (1956) was one of the first to focus attention on 
emergent properties. Ashby’s epistemological presupposition is that the organization of 
systems « is partly in the eye of the beholder », and, more specifically, as the observer’s 
viewpoint changes, a great variety of « arbitrary parts » can be determined (Ashby, 1968, p. 
110). On the other hand, with regard to the emergent properties of complex systems, even if 
ideally full knowledge of the parts should allow a complete prediction of the characteristics of 
the whole, Ashby acknowledges that « often, however, the knowledge is not, for whatever 
reason, complete » (Ashby, 1956, p. 111). He concludes that it is necessary, sometimes, « (to 
treat) the system as an unanalyzed whole » (Ashby, 1968, p. 109). In fact, in a situation 
involving a broad range of parts and arrangements, « (the) complex systems cannot be treated 
as an interlaced set of more or less independent feedback circuits, but only as a whole » 
(Ashby, 1956, p. 54). 
General System Theory, however, underwent a different sort of development. Even in his 
earliest writings, Ludwig von Bertalanffy, in reaction to the predominance of various forms of 
reductionism throughout the scientific disciplines (for the reductionist and emergentist 
categories see: Ayala and Dobzhansky, 1974; Koestler and Smythies, 1969; Ruse, 1988; 
 3 
Bergandi, 1998), proposed an alternative model that found a raison d'être, at least formally, in 
the phenomena of emergence. Bertalanffy (1968) considers the systems as real entities 
belonging to nature, and his interpretation of emergence raises a noteworthy anomaly. His 
definition could lead to the conclusion that emergence poses a baseless problem, because « If 
. . . we know the total of parts contained in a system and the relations between them, the 
behavior of the system may be derived from the behavior of the parts » (Bertalanffy, 1968, p. 
55). 
Note that the « pragmatic holism » of Simon and the « emergent materialism » of Bunge 
converge with Bertalanffy’s definition (see Bergandi, 1998). His methodological acceptance 
of emergence can ultimately be superimposed on the reductionist method (Amsterdamski, 
1981; Bergandi and Blandin, 1998, pp. 187-9). This is true despite Bertalanffy’s repeated 
assertions in principle to the contrary. 
The key to understanding this epistemological inconsistency can be found in the principle 
of « downward causation » proposed by Donald Campbell (1974), as well as in James 
Feibleman’s interpretation of emergence (Feibleman, 1954).  
The downward causation principle asserts the hierarchical organization of biological (and 
sociological) systems, in the sense that higher levels limit and determine the characteristics of 
lower levels: 
 
. . . the laws of the higher-level selective system determine in part the distribution of lower level 
events and substances. Description of an intermediate-level phenomenon is not completed by 
describing its possibility and implementation in lower-level terms. Its presence, prevalence or 
distribution (all needed for a complete explanation of biological phenomena) will often require 
reference to laws at a higher level of organization as well (Campbell, 1974, p. 180). 
 
Methodologically, this implies the necessity of an approach considering higher levels, 
because « upward causation » - which involves limiting analysis to the lower levels of the 
hierarchy - is not sufficient to explain the laws of a given level. Reference to the higher levels 
of integration is therefore essential, while, according to Bertalanffy and to some extent Ashby, 
knowledge of the parts and relationships of a given level should be sufficient. One trailblazer 
in the development of a multi-level epistemological perspective was Feibleman, who in a 
seminal paper in 1954 asserted that any level of integration characterized by specific 
emergent properties entails laws congruent with the level of complexity (Feibleman, 1954, pp. 
59 and 64). Like Campbell, Feibleman does not reject the necessity of analysis of the lower 
level of integration (Campbell, 1974, pp. 182-3), but he considers that knowledge of the lower 
level is insufficient, because « for an organization at any given level, its mechanism lies at the 
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level below and its purpose at the level above » (Feibleman’s italics) (p. 61). In other words, 
to analyze a given level, a study of at least three levels of integration is required. If, for 
example, the subject is an ecological system such as a community, it is necessary to consider 
simultaneously not only the population level, but also the ecosystem level. Therefore, 
Bertalanffy’s version of emergence, limited as it is to a study of the relationships between the 
parts of a system, in reality eviscerates the problem of emergence. His version is, rather, a 
form of « complexified reductionism ». While it is of course not limited to the mere analysis 
of a system's components, it nevertheless remains a reductionist approach in that it explains 
the higher levels by means of the lower levels.  
Finally, a framework founded on emergent properties and a triadic multilevel approach is 
essential in order to understand the epistemological value of the different heuristic models of 
cybernetics and General System Theory, in ecosystem, landscape and global ecology. 
 
 
Ecosystem ecology 
 
In ecology, the use of cybernetics models, which could be called ecocybernetics, reached its 
apex in the 1950s to 1970s. This was associated in particular with the rise of the Systems 
Ecology theory of E.P. and H.T. Odum. The use of cybernetics simulations and systems 
models in ecology continued, however, well into the 1980s and 1990s, at which point 
Landscape Ecology and Global Ecology, with its focus on global change, became the new 
frontiers of ecological research.  
The paradigm proposed by the Odum brothers reflects a judicious mélange of cybernetics 
and General System Theory and played a decisive part in the development of modern 
ecology. The concept of emergence is repeatedly invoked as the core of the systems approach 
(Odum, E.P., 1971, p. 6; Odum, E.P., 1993, pp. 29-30; Odum, H.T., 1994, p. 4). In passing, it 
is very interesting to note that for Odum, E.P. (1971) the reference for emergence is 
Feibleman (1954). Following in the path of the trophic-dynamics analysis of Lindeman 
(1942), the Odum brothers sought the basic energy relationships between living and nonliving 
parts of the ecosystem as a whole. This « formalized approach to holism » (Odum, E.P., 1971, 
p. 276) incorporated certain cybernetics models, and was characterized by a limited number 
of « key factors » which determined a large percentage of the action (Odum, E.P. 1971, p. 7). 
Although this research was undoubtedly « systemic », it should not be confused with an 
emergentist perspective, which stresses the « emergence » of specific characteristics at every 
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level of the hierarchical organization of biological systems. Indeed, formally it is the concept 
of emergence that is the basis of the following epistemological position: « . . . the findings at 
any level aid in the study of another level, but never completely explain the phenomena 
occurring at that level » (Odum, E.P., 1971, p. 5; Odum, E.P., 1992, p. 542; Odum, E.P., 
1993, p. 30; E.P. Odum’s italics). Otherwise, a reductionist perspective would suffice.  
Yet if we examine certain texts that summarize the work of the Odum brothers, such as 
Fundamentals of Ecology (1971), Ecology (1993) and Ecological and General Systems 
(1994), it is clear that cybernetics models based on energy flows and nutrient cycles in the 
ecosystem represent the core of the analysis (see Figure 1).  
The energetics approach to the ecosystem in the 1971 work is certainly very important, but 
later it will become even more decisive, to the extent that it even gave shape to the systems 
models used. Later, H.T. Odum, who developed many of the systems models used in the two 
brothers’ work, created an « energy circuit language » in order to construct energy diagrams 
for a wide variety of ecological systems, from the more basic trophic levels up to the 
biosphere (see the biosphere model in Figure 2).  
The authors of these systems models intended that they should have universal applicability, 
so as to avoid a « tower of Babel » of differing models (Odum, H.T., 1994, p. 579). 
Nevertheless, at the heart of their cybernetic and systems models lies a concept of feedback 
that inevitably engenders a standardizing and ultimately reductionist analysis of energy flows.  
 
 
Figure 1. A simplified energy flow diagram depicting three trophic levels in a linear food chain 
(E.P. Odum, 1971). 
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Figure 2. Interdependent 
phases of the biosphere in 
which structures of air, seas, 
and earth are maintained by 
interactive cycles driven by 
solar energy (H = human 
activity) (H.T. Odum, 1994). 
 
 
 
 
All the properties of ecosystems, communities and populations are translated into energetics 
terms. At best these models could be identified as « holological », in Hutchinson’s terms 
(Hutchinson, 1943, p. 152), where « matter and energy changes across [an ecological 
system's] boundaries are studied », but not as « holistic » (see Odum, E.P., 1971, p. 276), as 
holism inescapably involves the notion of emergence. An emergentist approach must be more 
respectful of the specificities of a given level, and in particular of constraints determined by 
higher levels. Instead, due to its narrow focus on thermodynamics, the Odumian paradigm not 
only « misses the emergences » but also is « hyper-reductionist » (Bergandi, 1995). All forms 
of energy (solar, chemical, kinetic, etc.) are reduced to a single form: heat (Mansson and 
McGlade, 1993, p. 593).   
Finally, when E.P. Odum (1977, p. 1290) treats the flow of energy as the true « emergent 
property » of an ecosystem, the emergent properties are confused with the collective 
properties. In fact, the latter result from the statistical dynamics of the lower level (Salt, 1979, 
p. 145), in this case, the level of physics. Though this physicalist method is of course 
legitimate for certain purposes, it is the contrary of a genuinely holistic approach to ecological 
systems and their emergent properties. 
 
 
Landscape ecology 
 
Landscape ecology results from the unification of many sources that over different periods 
contributed to the foundations of this discipline. One particularly important pioneer of 
landscape ecology was the German biogeographer Carl Troll. For Troll, the landscape was a 
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spatial and visual entity peculiar to mankind, a holistic entity integrating the geosphere, the 
biosphere and the totality of human artefacts. To explore such an entity, an ordinary analytical 
approach would not suffice; instead, it needed to be considered as a whole (Troll, 1939; 
Naveh and Lieberman, 1984). Nowadays, landscape ecology is structured around an 
epistemological Framework proposed by a Franco-American-Canadian school that, beginning 
in the 1980s, created a new research field with specific features and methods. This school 
introduced a new vocabulary — matrix, patch, corridor, connectivity, disturbance, etc. — that 
contributed to a new way of seeing and analyzing ecological systems. With their work 
Landscape Ecology, Forman and Godron (1986) played a key role, comparable to that of the 
Odum brothers in ecosystem ecology. The classic thesis of the ecosystemic paradigm 
revolved around the « homogeneity » of ecological systems and their tendency to maintain an 
« equilibrium state ». Attention was, moreover, focused mainly on the natural environment. 
Human interventions were minimized or even not observed. Landscape ecology brought about 
a radical change in the paradigm. The « heterogeneity » and « instability » of ecological 
systems are emphasized, and human actions are treated as factors in the transformation of the 
ecological process. 
Landscape ecology was also influenced more than other ecological disciplines by the 
works of Allen and Starr (1982) and O’Neill et al. (1986), who proposed a hierarchical 
conception of reality. The imagination of these authors was nourished not so much by the 
work of Feibleman and Campbell as by Koestler (1967, 1978) and Koestler and Smythies 
(1969), whose influence has touched many disciplines. For Koestler, there is a hierarchical 
organization to reality. Any level of this hierarchy — a holon — has a double face, as did 
Janus, the divinity of Roman mythology. Thus the holon is at the same time a totality, 
characterized by self-regulation and autonomy, and a part, subordinate to the higher level of 
the hierarchy (Koestler, 1967, pp. 55-6, 341; Koestler and Smithies, 1969, pp. 196-7, 207-12, 
1978, Ch. 1). Koestler rejects the possibility that a complex system can be reduced to the laws 
of the holons composing it. Nonetheless, although in the thought of Koestler the overlapping 
of levels determines the emergence of novelty, he does not propose a simultaneous study of 
different levels, as do Feibleman and Campbell, which signaled the rise of a true emergentist 
methodology.  
Ultimately, the arguments of Allen and Starr (1982), and O’Neill et al. (1986) in favour of 
a hierarchical conception of reality promoted a greater attentiveness in some works of 
landscape ecology to the relationships between different integration levels and different scales 
of observation. In the first issue of the journal Landscape Ecology, Frank Golley (1987), who 
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makes no reference to the works of Feibleman and Campbell, seeks to structure the 
methodological approach of landscape ecology, and tells us: 
 
Let me begin by restating the obvious. All studies involve three levels of attention: the object of 
interest, the components and functions within that object which explain its behavior, and the larger 
system of which the object is a part and which establishes its significance (p. 1). 
 
All things considered, many researchers will undoubtedly have difficulty seeing « the 
obvious », because works that formally seem to be closest to a systemic and emergentist 
approach propose, in reality, a model of multi-level analysis that conceals a typical — and 
ultimately reductionist — systemic analysis. Indeed, this is generally an expression of an 
analytico-additional method that is essentially based on the lower integration levels. Even 
where a triadic approach is employed, the search for emergent properties is absent or 
misconstrued.  
The paper of Urban et al. (1987) « Landscape ecology », for instance, represents the 
application of a hierarchical approach. It is a prime example of ambiguity of thought which, at 
least implicitly, should be logically structured around the concept of emergence, but which in 
fact employs a reductionist methodology. In this work, as in others (Risser, 1987, pp. 10-11), 
the central position of a hierarchical-emergentist perspective in landscape ecology is asserted. 
It is given great importance in the introduction, but then subsequently disregarded: 
 
. . . the hierarchical paradigm — Urban, O’Neill and Shugart tell us — provides the guidelines for 
defining the functional components of a system, and defines ways components at different scales are 
related to one another (e.g. lower-level units interact to generate higher-level behaviors and higher-
level units control those at lower levels) (p. 121). 
 
This perspective should represent a central assumption of landscape ecology, particularly as « 
. . . understanding a hierarchical phenomenon requires more than mechanism. Understanding 
requires that the mechanisms be considered in context » (Urban et al., 1987, p. 122). Yet 
when they consider the concrete analysis of a landscape, a mechanistic analysis takes shape, 
focusing on the relationships between the landscape elements (watershed, stand, gap). This 
paper shows clearly that a hierarchical ontology is not sufficient to avoid an essentially 
analytic and reductionist approach. 
 
The works of Naveh (1982, 1984) and of Naveh and Lieberman (1984), for example, 
extensively review many typical holistic principles. In these works, cybernetics is mixed in 
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with General System Theory and information theory (Shannon and Weaver, 1949). The 
paradigm propounded by Naveh (1982, p. 204), the « Total Human Ecosystem », is composed 
of all humanity and the total surrounding environment: 
 
This is a holistic, scientific theory of hierarchic order of open, living and ecological systems as holons 
with biocybernetic self-regulation and feedback control, and with the total human ecosystem as its 
highest level of integration. 
 
The total human ecosystem should represent the last level of a hierarchy consisting of 
organisms, populations, communities and ecosystems; it integrates the geosphere, the 
biosphere and the technosphere, the totality of human artefacts. The ecosphere is the largest 
landscape entity, while the ecotope is the smallest (Naveh, 1982, pp. 207-8, and 230; 1984, 
pp. 40, 44-5; Naveh and Lieberman, 1984, pp. 81-4). In this context, landscape ecology would 
thus play a crucial role as an integrative discipline. Nevertheless, the attempt to provide the 
landscape with basically holistic theoretical foundations breaks down when productivity and 
biotic diversity are identified as emergent properties (Naveh and Lieberman, 1984, p. 78). 
These are instead unquestionably the results of an analytico-additional method. 
The message of those who pointed out the inappropriateness of applying this method to 
ecological systems won an audience, particularly in the 1990s. Recently, a multi-level or 
triadic approach has been considered or applied in various works, while, of course, 
cybernetics and hierarchic conceptions have continued to be influential (Haber, 1990; 
Forman, 1995, pp. 9, 505; Dunnet, 1995, p. 80; King, 1997). We can thus consider research to 
be reductionist when the object of study is explained in terms of its components, and holistic 
(emergentist) when an effort is made to determine relationships with higher levels. 
Nevertheless, another problem is looming on the horizon: emergent properties are not at all 
taken into account in these works. A triadic methodology is the most realistic application of 
the concept of emergence. But does a hierarchy of integration levels that does not involve 
some emergent properties have any real meaning? Why must a given integration level be 
analyzed not only in terms of its components, but also in terms of those of the higher 
surrounding context? Why, that is, other than that the existence of emergent properties 
characterizes every integration level? This is all the more important since, if we accept the 
constructivist perspective (Foerster, 1981; Foerster and Stephen, 1995; see also Dewey and 
Bentley, 1949; Vallée, 1995, pp. 11-12), the delimitation (boundaries) of ecosystems and 
landscapes poses the epistemological question of the separation between the observed and the 
observer, in other words, the problem of the reality value of entities composing the hierarchies 
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of integration levels in scientific research. What should be the criteria for identifying a given 
integration level? The existence of emergent properties, such as inter alia self-organization, 
coherence and relative autonomy, could be used as indicators identifying integration levels 
with a high degree of reality. For example, an ecosystem, or even a landscape, is not really 
detectable, since it has no borders, no well-defined limits. The ecosystem represents rather a 
kind of methodological abstraction, that is useful for understanding the elements constituting 
a minimal system of ecological relationships. Nevertheless, we can assume that in the eyes of 
researchers such « abstract », « fictitious » integration levels manifest the emergent properties 
of levels with a higher degree of reality. For example, the mechanisms of self-regulation that 
we find in the ecosystem levels should belong, in reality, to the biosphere. 
 
 
Global ecology 
 
In the development of scientific ecology, the organicist metaphor is repeatedly employed to 
identify the specific characteristics of the « basic units of nature ». Entities such as, for 
example, the « biome » of Clements (1905, 1916) or the « biotic community » of Phillips 
(1931) have been analogized to organisms. Even though Tansley (1935) rejected the 
organicism of Clements and Phillips, his « ecosystem » was still termed a « quasi-organism ». 
With the emergence of global ecology, for instance in the approach of James Lovelock (1979, 
1988, 1991) — Vernadsky (1926) has been a precursor (see also Tagliagambe (1994)) — this 
metaphor took yet another step forward.  
According to the Gaia hypothesis, the Earth should not be viewed merely as if it were an 
organism, because it is an organism. For Lovelock, Gaia is the largest living being (1979, p. 
34; 1988, pp. 8 and 43), a « complex system », an « individual organism »; by controlling the 
physical and chemical environment, he argues, the biosphere functions as a self-regulating 
entity that maintains life on the planet (Lovelock, 1979, p. 9). In other words, Gaia is a 
cybernetics system that maintains homeostasis — the capacity of living beings to keep their 
internal environment constant — at the planetary level (Lovelock, 1979, pp. 11, 131-2). To 
comprehend the characteristics of this complex system that is the Earth, Lovelock proposed a 
multitude of cybernetics models. Here we will merely outline a simplified version of the 
Daisyworld model (Lovelock, 1988, II chap.). Daisyworld is a planet whose environment 
consists of one variable, the temperature, and two populations of daisies (white and black).  
The optimal temperature for growth is 208C, while temperatures below 58C or above 408C 
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are deadly; of course, warmer temperatures favour the white flower. At the beginning, the 
populations are uniformly distributed. Owing to temperature changes, a gradual succession of 
two populations should occur, a succession determined by positive feedback that, in 
accordance with the temperature, favours either the white or black daisies. Lovelock intends 
that this model should show Gaia’s capacity for self-regulation, and emphasizes the automatic 
modifications of the physical environment by the biotic component, without invoking any sort 
of internal finalism.   
He also considers that his exposition of a theory of a living planet is neither holistic nor 
reductionist. Nevertheless, in proposing a systemic, « physiological » study of the planet, 
considered as an entity composed of interdependent ecosystems (Lovelock, 1988, p. 181), 
references to holistic principles form a basic cornerstone of his work. In particular, he treats 
the concept of feedback as emblematic of a holistic approach (Lovelock, 1988, p. 216). 
Lovelock holds that cybernetics is structured around a set of holistic concepts, as did Odum. 
Indeed, Lovelock clearly acknowledged the Odumian influence on his work: « . . . I have felt 
a special empathy with the writings of the ecologist Eugene Odum » (Lovelock, 1988, 
Preface, p. xix). The cybernetic regulation of the planet is expressed in statements that, at first 
glance, certainly do appear to employ holistic principles: 
 
. . . the entire range of living matter on Earth, from whales to viruses, and from oaks to algae, could be 
regarded as constituting a single living entity, capable of manipulating the Earth’s atmosphere to suit 
its overall needs and endowed with faculties and powers far beyond those of its constituent parts 
(Lovelock, 1979, p. 9; see also: Lovelock, 1988, p. 19). 
 
Even more explicit is his definition of cybernetics systems: « the key to understanding 
cybernetic systems is that, like life itself, they are always more than the mere assembly of 
constituent parts » (Lovelock, 1979, p. 52). Furthermore, in relation to the planet’s capacity 
for self-regulation Lovelock states that: « Gaia as a total planetary being has properties that 
are not necessarily discernible by just knowing individual species or populations of organisms 
living together » (Lovelock, 1988, p. 19). He thus seems to identify self-regulation as an 
emergent property. However, probably owing to the influence of Odum, he too makes an 
amalgam between collective and emergent properties, by treating homeostasis as a collective 
property (Lovelock, 1988, p. 18), and thus miring himself in contradiction. Lovelock 
subsequently came to acknowledge homeostasis as an emergent property (Lovelock, 1991), 
but the basic confusion persisted. Moreover, Lovelock, in line with his organicist worldview, 
pointed out that to consider life as a passive adaptation to environmental changes was 
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simplistic and ultimately wrong. In contrast, he ventured the notion of a Gaia system wherein 
a relational continuity between the totality of biotic and abiotic complexes leads to the 
emergence of a self-regulating entity. Nonetheless, Lovelock did not manage to clearly situate 
the Gaia system within the higher integration level, the solar system. This necessity is, 
however, dealt with more cogently in Global Change, edited by Malone and Roederer (1985), 
which grew out of the Symposium held under the auspices of the International Council of 
Scientific Unions (Ottawa, 1984). In 1986, this international body launched the International 
Geosphere-Biosphere Programme (IGBP). For example, the gravitational influences of the 
other planets have an impact on the obliquity of the Earth’s axis of rotation and thus 
significantly affect the climate (Friedman, 1985, pp. 365-66). Likewise, the sun’s role with 
regard to changes in the emission of electromagnetic radiation and sub-atomic particles is 
crucial to understanding, among other processes, terrestrial electromagnetism and the specific 
mixture of atmospheric gases (Cole, 1985). 
 
There is a gap between Lovelock’s emergentist phraseology and his analytical 
methodology, which is concentrated in his conflation of or confusion between emergentist 
and collective properties. Underlying this is a fundamental methodological problem. It must 
be acknowledged that some similarity exists between cybernetics logic and certain theoretical 
kernels of emergentist thought. It is possible, for instance, to view feedback as a mechanism 
that determines the emergence of properties or behaviors that are not characteristic of the 
elements taken separately. However, a methodology is only genuinely emergentist when it 
treats the constraints of higher levels as a priority, and thus when it is not limited to taking the 
analysis of the lower levels alone as determinant (Feibleman, 1954; Campbell, 1974). Three 
objections need to be dealt with if we are to accept Lovelock’s equivalence between 
cybernetics systems and systems endowed with emergent properties. First, a system that 
contains one or more feedback loops is not necessarily a cybernetics system. To be a 
cybernetics system, a permanent information web is necessary (Engelberg and Boyarsky, 
1979, p. 320; according to these authors, neither the ecosystem nor the biosphere are 
cybernetics systems). Second, when a system is composed of an indefinite number of 
feedback loops, it is impossible to decompose it (Ashby, 1956, pp. 53-4). Third, for an 
approach to be holistic and emergentist, it is not sufficient that it is structured around the 
search for feedback loops. While feedback does lend itself to emergentist interpretation, at the 
same time an analysis is emergentist only when it is multi-level and attentive to the 
constraints of higher levels. 
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In other words, to seek an explanation of planetary self-regulation simply in terms of the 
feedback of physico-chemical elements means avoiding, or at least underestimating, an 
analysis of the bio-socio-ecological levels (including human intervention), and winds up 
embracing a reductionist approach. Lovelock’s litany of holistic refrains ultimately cannot 
drown out a constant temptation to circumvent the ecological problem by reducing the 
relationships of living beings to their environment, to an assemblage of physico-chemical 
processes interwoven into a complex cybernetics (see Deléage, 1991, p. 244). 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The different expressions of scientific ecology — ecosystem, landscape and global ecology 
— have felt the lasting influence of systems and cybernetics models, and of ontological, 
methodological and epistemological emergentism. Moreover, the concept of emergent 
properties, a classic topic in the philosophy of science, has played an important role in 
(mature) cybernetics and systems thinking, and has found a methodological application in the 
triadic, multi-level approach of Feibleman and Campbell. In ecosystem ecology, the Odumian 
paradigm structured the methods and objects of research. Eco-cybernetics models, centred on 
flows of matter and energy, have been considered emblematic of an emergentist approach. 
These models are instead the concrete offspring of a physicalist approach that « forgets » 
or misunderstands the specific emergent properties of ecosystems. Ecosystems are of course 
analyzed as systems, but not as ecological systems — their essential characteristics are 
reduced to the laws of physics.  
In landscape ecology, instead, it is possible to observe an ontological and methodological 
development that incorporates the triadic, multi-level approach. Nonetheless, while accepting 
a hierarchical perspective, on the one hand, leads the researcher to focus attention on 
processes that involve different integration levels, on the other, in practice, it leads to 
underestimating or misconstruing the importance of emergent properties. With landscape 
ecology, researchers felt the need for an analytical entity that was spatially larger in order to 
avoid losing information about the element and the totality. Nevertheless, a new problem 
arose: the reality value of the entities composing the hierarchies. In particular, are the 
landscape and the ecosystem entities with a high reality value? The possibility that these 
integration levels are mere « constructs » or « fictions » might be discarded if some clearly 
defined emergent properties could be identified. For the moment, it is more realistic to 
consider that the ecosystem and landscape « incorporate » the emergent properties of the 
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biosphere, an integration level with a high reality value. 
According to the Gaia hypothesis, the biosphere is the result of numerous interactions 
between its biotic and abiotic components. For ecologists, this observation sets the obvious 
framework for their discipline. Ultimately, it is little more than a restatement of Tansley’s 
concept of an « ecosystem ». With Gaia, the model of relations has been extended to include 
the entire planet, yet the emergentist jargon and cybernetics models overlie an essentially 
reductionist approach centred on energy flows. Indeed, Lovelock’s global ecology 
recapitulates all the main trends that have marked ecological thought and praxis, with all the 
inherent contradictions. And yet again, a holistic worldview proves to be independent of the 
methodology actually used. 
Finally, eco-cybernetics is an expression of a « reductionist systemism » that, in the case of 
the Odumian paradigm and the Gaia hypothesis, has become a form of « hyper-
reductionism », with all forms of energy reduced to heat. In landscape ecology, on the other 
hand, the recognition of the importance of a multi-level, triadic approach has nonetheless 
gone hand in glove with an underestimation of the importance of emergent properties in 
identifying a specific integration level. 
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